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Abstract 
In the 1980s, Japanese financial institutions and keiretsu firms had to face 
domestic and international structural challenges, which occurred because 
of the structural changes in the keiretsu production system such as 
outsourcing and downsizing, as well as monetary and financial factors due 
to major financial liberalization reforms. 
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Introduction: The Keiretsu Organizations 
 
The zaibatsu and the wartime economic system were the two main elements in Japan‘s 
economic modernization during the prewar era. Many well-known Japanese economists 
and historians, such as Aoki (1988), Noguchi (1998), and Okazaki (1994a, 1994b) have 
focused on the fundamental structural changes in the Japanese capitalist paradigm 
during the inter-war period and the Second World War. They believed that the primary 
distinctiveness of the system survived the war and continued to influence important 
elements of the economy of postwar Japan. They argued that important features of the 
postwar economic institutions in Japan, such as the keiretsu organizations and the main 
bank system, characterized by ―high debt/equity ratios, greater reliance on bank loans 
than securities markets, a  closer relationship between banks and borrowers, extensive 
corporate cross-shareholding, [and] greater guidance from the government in credit 
allocation, etc.‖ (Monzur 2004:4) emerged during and shortly after these periods due to 
the consequences of the wartime regulations.  
Noguchi (1998), for example, pointed out that the relics of the wartime 
economic structure, such as close cooperation between the state, big business and the 
banking industry, still continued to provide the basic outlines of the present economic 
system. The Japanese economic system, which was initially intended to fight a total 
war, survived to play a fundamental role in the Japanese economy during the high 
growth era. The aim of mobilizing the total power of the national economy changed 
from military to economic after WWII, but the main formation of the system itself has 
continued to dominate the modern Japanese economy.  
The dissolving of the zaibatsu and rise of bank-centered financing were the 
result of the most important structural changes in the Japanese economy during this 
period. Wartime regulations had weakened zaibatsu organization by lessening the 
control of the zaibatsu families over the holding companies and increasing managerial 
control over Japanese corporate governance. By the end of the war, Japan had fully 
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achieved ―managerial capitalism‖ (Abe 1997:303). These major modifications 
restructured the Japanese economic and financial system and increased the importance 
of cross- shareholding and bank-centered financing in the postwar era. Many 
economists agree that, with this new corporate governance and finance system, the 
Japanese economy obtained the strategic flexibility and competitive advantage to 
become a global economic power. For example, Ozawa (1999) argued that the 
strengthening of capital-intensive, scale-driven heavy and chemical industries in the 
early postwar period required high levels of technical and management skills and 
massive amounts of capital, and entailed high financial risks. The keiretsu and the main 
bank system, together with close cooperation with the state, reduced this financial risk 
and made Japan able to complete its industrialization process successfully. 
As a consequence of the keiretsu success during the high growth era, the 
Japanese corporate governance model and aspects of Japanese industrial organization 
were often acclaimed as ―alternative models‖ to Western-style capitalism for sustainable 
economic development and corporate success (Cowling and Tomlinson 2002:374). 
Caves and Uekusa (1976) argued that the keiretsu firms were one of the most 
―conspicuous forces‖ in Japan‘s rapid industrial development and transformation. 
During the high growth era, keiretsu firms and the main bank system took over the role 
of allocation in Japan‘s development strategy. Johnson (1982), Sheard (1991), Dow 
(2003) and many other economists considered the Japanese keiretsu system as a source 
of ―strategic advantage‖ for the Japanese firms in the global arena. They argued that 
their organizational structure and also their relations with the Japanese government 
created competitive advantages for the keiretsu firms to compete with multinational 
firms in domestic and international markets.  
 
The Horizontal and the Vertical Keiretsu Organizational Structure  
 
Keiretsu groups are commonly divided into horizontal and vertical keiretsu groups, 
according to their organizational structure. Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, 
and Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Groups are the most widely cited horizontally organized 
bank-centered keiretsu groups. Gerlach (1992a) and Hoshi et al. (1991) note that about 
sixty percent of the 200 largest industrial firms and almost all the leading financial 
institutions have strong business connections with a horizontal keiretsu. Gerlach 
(1992a) has pointed out that these ―big six‖ groups are estimated to account for 15 
percent of total corporate assets and 50 percent of total corporate sales in the Japanese 
economy.  
Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) argue that there are significant structural differences 
between zaibatsu and keiretsu groups. In particular, the keiretsu group companies are 
more autonomous than the zaibatsu firms because of differences in their corporate 
governance structures. Unlike the zaibatsu network, there is no single family or firm 
which has the majority of the controlling stock, and there is no central authority like a 
―holding company with the power to direct the other firms‖ (Hoshi and Kashyap 
2001:11). They do not have a hierarchical structure, and each member firm has an equal 
relationship in shareholding and transactions (Abe 1997:303). In most of the cases, the 
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main banks and general trading companies (sogo shosha; Dicken and Miyamachi 
1998:56) were the biggest shareholders with the authority to monitor and ultimately 
control the companies‘ corporate governance and investment decisions. ―A keiretsu 
member firm obtains most of its capital from other members, including the main bank, 
which is typically the largest lender and holds a substantial equity stake in the firm‖ 
(Osano and Hori 2002:11).  Each of these keiretsu groups had several core firms (such 
as a large bank, a trading house, and a heavy machinery company), but no company was 
dominant in terms of its ownership stake; rather, each group member owned, on 
average, 1-2% of the shares of other group members‖ (Schaede 2006:29). 
 The member firms were autonomous to make operational decisions but they were 
most likely to follow the long-term strategy for the entire group. ―This structural 
autonomy and group connection give a competitive edge to each member firm in a 
number of aspects of their operations, such as providing in-group loans from the main 
banks, offering member firms domestic markets for the products, and offering 
international marketing capabilities.‖ (McGuire 2002:33) The group companies usually 
avoid competing with each other in the same sector, which is known as ―one-setism‖ 
(Schaede 2006:29). ―In this way, interdependencies are managed not through control 
over single markets, but through the spreading of risk across weakly correlated 
economic sectors‖ (Gerlach 1992b:115). 
 
The Vertical Keiretsu Network 
 
The vertical corporate governance model was developed by Toyota during the 1930s 
and shortly after became common among other big firms in the military, automobile and 
electronic industries. Big companies, especially the zaibatsu firms which produced 
weapons for the Japanese army during the war period, began to subcontract some of 
their work to smaller firms to increase their production capacity with minimum capital 
investment. They divided product assembly into discrete steps and each product 
assembly was carried out by a separate contractor firm.
 
This transaction system initially 
persisted after the war since it gave a competitive advantage to the apex firms during 
business expansion. Therefore this type of organization became very common in the 
automobile, consumer electronics, and petrochemical industries. In the post-war era, the 
keiretsu firms ―became the centre of all Japanese industrial production and began to 
dominate economic decision-making, often dictating the conditions of contract and 
modes of production to their keiretsu partners‖ (Cowling and Tomlinson 2000:367). 
―Vertical keiretsu groups controlled most of the industrial production and also 
distribution keiretsu, a subgroup of vertical keiretsu, controlled much of Japanese 
retailing.‖1 Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Matsushita, Sony, Fujitsu, Sharp, Sanyo, Hitachi, 
Mitsui, Idemitsu and Maruzen are some of the well-known vertical keiretsu groups in 
Japan.  
Aoki (1984), Lawrence (1993) and also Mori (1994) argue that this kind of 
coordinated enterprise provided many benefits to the apex firms and their suppliers. 
                                                        
1
 http://searchcio-midmarket.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid183_gci518852,00.html 
- 41 - 
 
Close links between apex firms and contractors diminished the transactions costs, 
increased the research and level of the technology transfer, and amplified the 
investments by providing the financing and sharing the risk. Mori (1999:2) suggested 
that ―it is a better competitive strategy for a large company to contract large portions of 
its products to a smaller company, because it can reduce production costs more 
effectively if the quality of goods or services is uniform. It is also natural that the 
contracted companies give other still smaller companies production orders, assuming 
that the quality remains the same.‖ This method of ―procuring parts from outside 
suppliers is more flexible and open than the method of organizing in-house divisions to 
manufacture parts.‖ Also, vertical keiretsu give low cost internal equity finance and 
increase cash flows of member firms so they can invest more in R&D and technology 
transfer. The apex firms are also able to plan, coordinate and outsource the R&D and 
new product development. This flexibility gives a strategic advantage to the firm to 
develop new products in a shorter time period with lower costs. ―Vertical keiretsu firms 
are alleged only to coordinate decision making with the firms directly above and 
directly below them in the pyramid. This decentralized planning is possible because the 
integration in vertical keiretsu is much tighter, with no superfluous firms that are not 
direct parts of the production chain leading to the final products of the apex firm‖ 
(Morck 2005:37). Furthermore: ―the core assembler firms often provide the financing 
that is needed to maintain smooth intra-group production operations. Such collaborative 
financing, provided at low cost, alleviates the liquidity constraints of firms‖ (McGuire 
and Dow 2002:33).   
These types of vertical enterprise organizations are more like a pyramid. The 
core assembler firms often hold controlling blocks of equity in each of their main parts 
suppliers. Each of these suppliers holds controlling blocks in its suppliers, and those 
companies can hold controlling blocks in yet another tier of suppliers (Randall and 
Masao 2003:75). This has the effect of establishing direct lines of communication and 
allows for the dissemination of corporate strategy through the hierarchy of firms 
throughout the supply chain
 
(Tomlinson 2002:379). Also, only a small amount of the 
stock in these suppliers is available to public investors. Therefore the apex firm controls 
the majority of the suppliers‘ shares and it is very difficult for hostile takeovers. In some 
cases, apex firms and their suppliers can work with independent firms, but most of the 
time independent firms want to sell some of their controlling blocks to the core 
assembler firms to guarantee their business. For example, ―Matsushita Electronics 
Company, Panasonic, which used to specialize in consumer electronics, had to purchase 
stock of relevant companies in order to begin to supply them with business electronics. 
This shows that these industries maintain some traditional Japanese-style relationships‖  
(Mori 1994:2). Also the practice of purchasing the stock of relevant companies is very 
common in other industries such as in petrochemicals, telecommunications, and 
automobiles. For example ―as in a prewar zaibatsu, the Toyoda family has substantial 
control over Toyota Motors itself. Some of the Toyota keiretsu firms are spin-offs from 
Toyota Motors or from other older keiretsu member firms. Others are independent firms 
that find it advantageous to cement their alliances to Toyota by selling controlling 
blocks to Toyota firms, and so joining the Toyota keiretsu‖ (Morck 2005:37). 
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The Inter-Firm Relationships within the Group Companies 
 
Much of the existing literature on keiretsu gives attention to their close inter-firm 
relationships within the group companies and with their main banks. Many economists 
agree that the keiretsu organization structure gives a strategic advantage to the member 
firms in the international and domestic market. As Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Hoshi et 
al. (1991), and Aoki et al. (1994) have argued, the close inter-firm relationships within 
the group companies alleviate incentive, information, and control problems related with 
agency conflicts, thus serving as effective corporate governance and monitoring 
mechanisms. Dore (1983), Odagiri (1992), Lawrence (1993), Porter (1994), and 
Miyajima & Kuroki (2005) have also noted that cross-shareholding also played a vital 
role in sustaining Japanese management and growth-oriented firm behavior during the 
high growth era. This corporate governance model allowed keiretsu managers to focus 
on long-term investment decisions rather than stock price maximization, so that it freed 
them from the pressures of the stock market and the fear of takeovers. Hoshi et al. 
(1990) have pointed out that group companies invest more than independent firms 
during an economic crisis and consequently recorded a faster return to normal 
performance. 
 Caves and Uekusa (1976), Nakatani, (1984), Sheard (1989), Hoshi et al. (1990), 
Ahmadjian & Robbins (1999), and Lincoln et al. (1996) have argued that the bank-
centered horizontal keiretsu group firms have the property of risk-sharing, thus 
facilitating more risky, long-term, low margin, high growth strategies for member firms 
and reducing the risk of bankruptcy by giving financial and managerial support to a 
troubled member firm which encounters economic difficulties. In this situation, keiretsu 
firms carried out the function of an ―internal market resource allocator,‖ purchasing 
more from a troubled firm during an economic crisis. For example, Mitsubishi and 
Sumitomo member firms and employees purchased more Mitsubishi and Mazda cars 
when the group car manufacturers faced financial difficulties. Furthermore, Lincoln et 
al. (1996) argue that internal trade between keiretsu companies is frequently used as 
cross-subsidization within the group to develop growth and market share in new 
products or in foreign markets. Like Gerlach, (1992a) and Hoshi (1994), McGuire and 
Dow (2002) note that ―In addition, as an internal market, the keiretsu provides member 
firms with access to resources controlled by other members, thereby easing resource 
constraints and encouraging firm growth‖ (McGuire and Dow 2002:33). Sheard (1994) 
and Aoki (1990) suggest that the financial and internal trade links between the keiretsu 
firms, customers and suppliers, and financial institutions provide financial and strategic 
flexibility to the group firms and thus enhance the overall efficiency of keiretsu firms. 
Also the main firms, especially in the automobile, consumer electronics, and chemical 
industries, control the sales and distribution of their products by establishing subsidiary 
firms, even at the retail level. With this strategy, keiretsu firms have been able to control 
new market entries. Lincoln (1996), Lawrence (1991) argue that keiretsu have often 
been portrayed as collusive institutions that impede foreign entry into Japanese markets. 
Imports and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are remarkably insignificant in markets 
where keiretsu-affiliated firms have large market shares. Even ―after tariff barriers had 
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been dismantled, Western firms found that entry into industrial markets in Japan was 
complicated by vertical sourcing relationships in which large Japanese firms had 
‗inside‘ and ‗outside‘ suppliers for most inputs‖ (Westney 1996:6). 
 
The Keiretsu Firms and ‘Main Bank’ Financing 
 
Okazaki (1992), Aoki et al. (1994), Hoshi and Kashyap (2001), and Teranishi (2007) 
have summarized the evolution of the relations between banks and firms during the high 
growth era. Aoki et al. (1994:16) argue that, ―the Japanese main bank system, which 
came into being in the early post-World War II period, was not created de novo by 
government fiat or bank-business decisions. It had important historical antecedents as 
the pre-war banking system and industrial system (including zaibatsu) evolved.‖ Policy 
measures particularly relevant to the evolution of the main bank system were the 
promotion of bank consortia for long-term investment loans initiated in the 1930s and 
the introduction of the designated banking system in 1944
 
(Aoki 2001:335). During the 
interwar period, in order to support the military, the military leadership had to increase 
the financial allocation to the armaments industries. As a consequence, the Japanese 
government mobilized the national economy to give all the necessary administrative and 
financial support to munitions suppliers
 
(Okazaki 1992). During the period of Japanese 
militarism, the capital markets were strictly regulated by the government and gave 
limited access for firms to assemble funding. As a result, bank-based financing became 
the major source of finance for most of the major zaibatsu firms and other armaments 
manufacturers.  
The legacy of the wartime controls on the capital markets had a substantial 
impact on the Japanese corporate finance and governance system. The wartime financial 
system was initially directed toward regulating the distribution of funds, and later 
strengthened regulations restricting the power of shareholders over corporate 
managements (Okazaki et al 1999:77).  The wartime regulations such as limitations on 
stockholders‘ rights and dividend jurisdiction through the military leadership reduced 
the attractiveness of capital markets to the investors who consequently shifted their 
portfolios from the security markets to the banks (Hoshi and Kashyap 2001:570).  This 
transformation was strongly supported by the government because it was easier for the 
Ministry of Finance to transfer the nation‘s savings into the war industries through the 
banking system. Furthermore the government reduced the influence of the zaibatsu 
family councils over corporate management. In addition to restricting shareholders‘ 
rights and the introduction of an incentive system for workers, the military enabled 
armaments manufacturers to increase the armaments supply.  
Tsutsui (1999:14) argued that the Pacific War and the planned economy had a 
number of persistent effects on the Japanese corporate finance and governance system. 
The wartime regulations marked a structural alteration in the financial system by 
transforming it from market-based financing to central bank-based financing. Important 
features of the financial structure and policies toward financial markets developed in 
wartime were continued virtually unchanged during the postwar Allied Occupation. 
More importantly, many became the foundation and framework for the postwar 
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financial system, persisting virtually to the present, even though the goals of postwar 
government policy shifted dramatically from military production to civilian, industry-
based, rapid economic growth. 
Aoki et al. (1994) argued that at the end of the war, the Occupation authorities 
dissolved the zaibatsu and made holding companies illegal, but they could not pursue 
major structural reforms to alter the financial system. Thus many aspects of the wartime 
corporate finance and governance system remained intact and continued to dominate the 
real economy. Only the zaibatsu family members lost their share in the zaibatsu banks, 
but the ‗big five‘2 zaibatsu banks and other city banks retained power and most of their 
stock was bought by other member firms during the cross-shareholding between the ex-
zaibatsu network members. Since the banks were allowed to hold 5 percent of stock in 
non-financial firms, the old zaibatsu firms wanted to expand their crossholdings of 
shares with their banks because widening share ownership had created uncertainties in 
management ownership relations. As the managements‘ autonomy grew, so the banks‘ 
control of firms was strengthened. (Okazaki et al.1999:83). ―This bank holding was 
instrumental in maintaining and reviving old zaibatsu company connections based on 
mutual stockholding, leading to the post-war keiretsu system‖ (Aoki et al. 1994:45). 
Subsequent to this, stable crossholding ties meant that there was a significant increase in 
bank financing among the keiretsu network members. By arranging these crossholdings 
and supplying funds, the banks came to take on the role of leaders of the various 
keiretsu groupings (Okazaki et al.1999:83). 
 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Keiretsu Networks 
 
After the end of the Second World War, the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) was established by the Japanese government to replace the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. Most of the bureaucrats from the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry continued their careers under this new organization and their ideas continued to 
influence MITI‘s industrial policies. Johnson (1982) argued that post-war reforms, by 
curtailing the powers of the zaibatsu and eliminating the army from the political scene, 
created a vacuum which was filled neither by the labor movement, nor by the 
politicians, but by the bureaucracy, and, in particular, by the Ministry of Finance and 
MITI. From an early stage, MITI‘s emphasis was on restructuring the Japanese 
economy to bring industrial output back to the pre-war level. During the occupation era, 
MITI and the U.S. Occupation authority had a major divergence on Japan‘s long term 
economic development policy. The U.S. mainly wanted to weaken Japan‘s economic 
and military sovereignty to counter Japan‘s influence in the region. They dismantled the 
zaibatsu holding companies, and insisted MITI follow a development model which 
promoted labor-intensive and lower value-added industries such as textile and garment 
manufacturing. The MITI bureaucrats opposed this policy and allocated Japan‘ 
resources to high value added ―strategic‖ industries such as electronics, chemical 
industries, iron and steel, shipbuilding, machine tools, cars, electric power, and 
                                                        
2
 Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Yasuda, and Daiichi were the big five financial monopolies. 
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petrochemicals to rebuild the Japanese economy (Johnson 1982:229-238). Shigeru 
Yoshida, who served several terms as prime minister of Japan after World War II, was 
the chief architect of this resistance (Kopstein and Lichbach 2005:160).  
Since then, the Japanese government has supported the keiretsu firms in 
‗strategic industries‘. ―These favored industries have been aided with government-
sponsored collaborative research projects, R&D subsidies, preferential access to capital 
and (at least) temporary trade protection‖ (Lawrence 1993:4). MITI limited the 
competition and also restricted entry to markets that were considered ―strategic.‖ Ito 
(1997:17) has summarized how the government targeted and promoted specific sectors 
and firms. He argues that ―Japanese firms either licensed foreign technology or reverse 
engineered foreign products to catch up. As the economy grew and firms gained 
experience in production, the successful ones were able to expand. Increasing returns to 
scale brought down production costs, and returns to scale were further enhanced when 
these firms started to export and became more competitive in the world market. When 
the sector reached this stage, restrictions on imports were liberalized.‖ Krugman (1998) 
and Ito (1997) argue that although MITI closed the domestic market to international 
competition, it always wanted several keiretsu groups to invest and compete in the same 
industries, ―thus providing the necessary degree of competition without which 
protectionism and administrative guidance would not have worked‖ (Bolitho 1985:199). 
 
As Bolitho (1985:190) suggests: 
 
―The major reason for this policy stemmed from an emphasis on the 
importance of the internal market which came, in turn, from an 
implicitly Kaldorian (and Schumpeterian) view of the growth 
process—that the key to development and international 
competitiveness is economies of scale in manufacturing, particularly 
in a few large firms in each branch. Trying to achieve such economies 
through export growth was too expensive and risky a strategy—it 
required a high initial level of subsidy, since Japan‘s industry was too 
weak to sustain world market competition, and it relied implicitly on 
the maintenance of high demand abroad and on the absence of foreign 
protective barriers, neither of which could be taken for granted in the 
1950s. Hence the required scale economies had to be achieved first 
through domestic market growth, which would provide Japanese 
industry with sufficiently high levels of demand for the chosen few 
large firms to reach best-practice technology and internationally 
competitive cost levels.‖ 
 
There was a strong positive correlation between MITI‘s strategic industries and the 
keiretsu firms‘ investments. In the high growth period, the keiretsu firms‘ strategic 
emphasis was on the traditional commodities and products such as electronics, 
petrochemicals, steel, cars and shipbuilding. During and after the first oil crisis, keiretsu 
firms‘ strategic emphasis shifted towards ‗knowledge-intensive‘ (Johnson 1982:288) 
―industries with relatively modest energy and raw materials requirements and 
comparatively high value added per yen spent on imported inputs. They accelerated the 
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investment in high value-added sectors, such as ―sophisticated machinery (including 
robots and aircraft), transport equipment, fabricated metal products, microelectronics, 
fiber optics, lasers, atomic energy, fish farming, ocean development, pollution control, 
solar energy, etc.‖ (Carson and Traynor 1997:213). Dore (1983) argued that during this 
period keiretsu firms also went through a major restructuring process to reduce the 
number of non-performing firms through mergers or closing down factories in the 
shipbuilding and petrochemicals industries. 
MITI used personal connections to implement a policy of encouraging the rapid 
development of strategic sectors. After WWII, MITI focused on the coal and steel 
industries, and then they shifted their support toward heavy industries, mostly to 
chemicals, shipbuilding and automobiles. By the late 1970s after the major oil crisis, 
this support mostly concentrated on the high-tech sector and electronics. ―The oil shock 
strongly challenged the Japanese perception of the optimal industrial structure centered 
on heavy-chemical industries. MITI started two important projects aimed at reducing 
the dependence of the Japanese economy on oil. It started the Sunshine Plan in 1974 
which focused on developing a substitute for oil, and the Moonlight Plan in 1978, which 
emphasized energy-saving technology. In the meantime, the Japanese quickly shifted 
their industrial structure to high-tech industries. During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
relatively strong growth of the Japanese economy [was] supported by the shift toward 
high technology industries‖ (Morris-Suzuki 1989). 
 Cowling and Tomlinson (2000) argued that though MITI and the keiretsu worked 
very closely, over time MITI‘s influence on the keiretsu firms lessened. Japan‘s large 
firms, which sought to become global players, began to dispute MITI‘s powers and in 
many case keiretsu firms pursued their own interests instead of complying with MITI 
policies. For example Ito (1997:17) notes that ―[i]n the early 1960s, MITI attempted to 
merge several automobile manufacturers into two groups of firms, arguing that there 
were too many automobile manufacturers in Japan.‖ For similar reasons in the 1980s, 
MITI also encouraged the petrochemicals firms to reduce their capacity and to merge 
eleven petrochemical complexes into four. The keiretsu firms rejected MITI‘s policy 
recommendations and retained their self-sufficiency. ―If MITI had succeeded in 
reducing their number, domestic competition would have been stifled and Japanese 
automobiles and chemicals industries might not have dominated the world market in the 
1980s‖ (Ito 1997:17). Although significant changes have occurred since the 1970s, it 
has been argued that Japan‘s political economy has remained developmentalist in its 
fundamental characteristics (Yamamura and Streeck 2003:5). 
 
The Bank-Based Financial System and Keiretsu Firms 
 
―Since the Japanese corporate sector was the driving force behind the growth economy, 
the main focus of the Japanese financial system was to provide a favorable environment 
for the corporate sector‖ (Ouandlous and Philippatos 1999:8). During the high growth 
era, the Japanese banking system became strategically important in the Japanese 
government‘s policies to create substantial growth. According to Ito (2000:95-96), 
Japan‘s financial system was one of the most regulated and administratively controlled 
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in the world. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) and The Bank of Japan (BoJ) were the 
main policy makers in the bank-based financial system. The implementation of 
macroeconomic and monetary policies in the financial market was carried out by these 
two government organizations.  
 The Japanese financial institutions were functionally separated, and the MoF 
strictly defined the scope of their activities. ―Each segment of the banking industry 
serves a distinct segment of the market. With certain exceptions, players in one sector 
are not permitted to engage in business in any other sector‖ (Milhaupt and Miller 
2000:248). Unlike the Anglo-American banking system, the Japanese banking system is 
systematically segmented into commercial banking and long-term credit banking. Also 
the Japanese commercial banks were separated into ―city‖ and ―regional‖ banks 
according to their branch networks. Most of their business was short and long term 
lending to Japanese corporations. City banks were by far the most powerful financial 
institutions in Japan. Regional banks, on the other hand, have strong ties with small and 
medium firms in their local area as well as with local government (Lapavitsas 1996:24). 
  During the post war high growth era, the Japanese government allowed only the 
long-term credit banks to raise funds through the issuance of long-term debt securities. 
City and regional banks were limited to issuing debentures. The trust banks were strictly 
separated from ordinary banks, and they were permitted to accept five-year loan trusts.  
Lapavitsas (1996) argued that with this policy, the MoF aimed to facilitate the flow of 
cheap long-term investment funds to industry by the long-term credit banks. The Bank 
of Japan tightly controlled the interest rate, money supply and foreign exchange rates to 
create the necessary capital to support industrial development. The Japanese 
government was subsidizing the banks to create low cost financing for industrial 
development. BoJ policies were structured to supply central bank credit to the 
commercial banking system. Under the central bank-based finance system, the BoJ 
injected massive amounts of capital into the commercial banking system by setting 
interest rates below market-clearing rates. Additionally, the Bank of Japan often 
injected significant amounts of capital into the group banks. These funds were used as 
extended industrial credits by firms closely affiliated to the banks, known as the ―bank-
led‖ companies, or kinyu keiretsu (Ozawa 1999:353). 
MITI and the MoF collaborated to restructure the financial system to provide 
preferential long-term finance for keiretsu firms‘ investments. In response to a 
perceived capital demand from the keiretsu and other firms, and also to promote the 
development of capital-intensive heavy and chemical industries after WWII, the 
government established the long-term Credit Bank of Japan (Nihon Choki Shinyo 
Ginko) and the Development Bank of Japan (Nihon Kaihatsu Ginko).  Lapavitsas 
(1997) argued that, ―with this policy, the MoF aimed to facilitate the flow of cheap 
long-term investment funds to industry from the long-term credit banks. The long-term 
credit banks were systematically providing significant amounts of cheap funds for the 
keiretsus’ industrial investment. Cheap BoJ funds and low interest rates created a stable 
environment for the long-term credit banks and city banks to transfer massive amounts 
of cheap money to the keiretsu firms to invest in the capital-intensive heavy engineering 
and chemical industries.‖ 
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The Japanese government also played a very significant role in the direct 
financing of keiretsu development projects. The government mostly provided money for 
keiretsu development projects through the Japan Development Bank, or through direct 
lending to keiretsu financial institutions such as the city banks. The Japanese 
Development Bank enabled funds to be directed from the postal savings system to 
MITI‘s designated ―strategic industries‖ (Cowling and Tomlinson 2000:364). ―Tokyo 
provided 18.7 percent of all funds to the non-financial sector between 1970 and 1975‖ 
(Sato 1985:105). As Ozawa (1999) has argued, Japan‘s high-growth policy was heavily 
dependent on the banks‘ ability to supply the necessary capital to corporations to invest 
in capital-intensive industries. Those kind of large-scale capital-intensive investments 
entailed high financial risks; therefore, without government financial support and 
guarantees, keiretsu firms and banks might have been unwilling to invest large-scale 
capital in the heavy and chemical industries.  
 The BoJ was systematically providing funds for keiretsu industrial investment, 
especially in the large-scale capital-intensive, chemical and heavy engineering sectors. 
They subsidized the keiretsu group banks by keeping the official BoJ‘s discount rate 
lower than the inter-bank deposit rate and allowing banks to keep their equity to asset 
ratio lower than the required level. With these policies, the MoF endeavored to increase 
the banks‘ lending capacities. These policies increased the risk of bank failure, but 
banks were willing to take risks because they expected BoJ support. All the banks were 
strategically very important for the government. And neither MITI nor the MoF could 
allow any bank failures. Ozawa (1999:2) believed that ―the government would always 
come to the rescue if something ever went wrong to threaten the banks‘ financial 
health.‖  
 Kanaya and Woo (2000) argue that the Ministry of Finance developed 
distinctive formal and informal approaches to avoid bank failures such as the implicit 
blanket protection of deposits and the ‗convoy system‘, ―[r]ather than rely on the formal 
legal mechanisms supplied by the deposit insurance system‖ (Milhaupt and Miller 
2000:249). As an alternative to direct capital injections through a deposit insurance 
system during a crisis at a bank, the government amalgamated the financially troubled 
bank with a stronger bank. ―The MoF encouraged stronger, healthier banks to absorb 
insolvent institutions—called the ‘hogacho’ rescue operation—through informal, 
administratively orchestrated bank purchase and assumption (P&A) transactions‖ 
(Kawai 2005:317). With the convoy system, ―all banks were tied to each other and 
thereby ultimately in the same liquidity situation … this bank domination leads to 
governmental hesitance and regulatory forbearance‖ (Svensson et al. 2006:66).  Most 
banks agreed to be part of the convoy system because they felt more secure. Even 
though they had to rescue financially troubled banks by injecting their own capital at the 
end of the rescue operation, they had the right to take over the failed bank‘s branch 
rights. Since the opening of new branches was strictly controlled and limited by the 
MoF, taking over a bank‘s branch rights were very important for banks to increase their 
market share.  
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The Liberalization Process in the Japanese Economy during the mid 1970s and its   
Impact on the Keiretsu Firms Corporate Finance and Governance Practice 
 
The keiretsu firms‘ overseas investments were highly regulated by MITI until the end of 
the high growth era due to the government policy of protecting Japan‘s foreign 
exchange reserves and avoiding balance of payments difficulties
 
(Bilgin 1982:257).  
During this period, only the few keiretsu firms in the mining industry and some other 
small firms in low technology, labor intensive and declining industries such as textiles, 
manufacturing and shipbuilding were allowed to invest overseas and subsidized by the 
Japanese government to do so. Dicken, (1998), and Cowling and Tomlinson (2000) 
argue that these investments were only allowed as long as they were favorable to the 
long-term strategic interests of the Japanese economy. For example, Kojima noted that, 
during the 1960s and 1970s, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and other major companies in the 
mining industry were allowed by MITI to invest overseas, mostly in resource-rich 
countries with abundant low-cost labor in East Asia, and South America to provide the 
necessary raw materials for the Japanese heavy and chemical industries. 
 Due to the liberalization process in the Japanese economy during the mid 1970s, 
the Japanese government began to relax its control on overseas investments, so that 
keiretsu firms were able to freely expand their global interests. The substantial capital 
accumulation because of the trade surplus of the keiretsu firms during the high growth 
era, along with the liberalization process, made keiretsu firms able to pursue their own 
strategic interests, free from limitations imposed by MITI. As a consequence, the 
keiretsu firms shifted their investment strategy from resources and cheap labor in 
developing countries to market-oriented, technology-based investments in industrialized 
countries (Yoon 1990:10). During this period, a number of factors encouraged the 
keiretsu and other Japanese firms to invest significantly in the more sophisticated 
consumer markets of North America and Europe (Cowling and Tomlinson 2000:368). 
 The first oil shock, the Nixon shock, and subsequently the Plaza Accord, which 
increased production costs in Japan relative to overseas, and also the increasing trade 
barriers due to regional organizations such as the EC and NAFTA, forced the keiretsu 
firms‘ managements to restructure their growth strategies in foreign trade and foreign 
investment. As a consequence, they decided to move some of their higher value-added 
sector production facilities overseas to overcome trade barriers and to reduce their 
production costs, so as to be more competitive in the global market. Over time, these 
firms have systematically increased their offshore production capacity compared with 
their domestic operations.
 
The Japanese consumer electronics, petrochemical, steel, car 
and shipbuilding industries are the main sectors in which ―exports are increasingly 
being replaced by overseas production, while the Japanese home market is gradually 
being supplied by Japanese affiliates, predominantly based in East Asia‖ (Cowling and 
Tomlinson, 2000:373). Yoon (1990:6) argued that the characteristics of Japanese FDI 
were associated with Japan‘s industrial transformation from labor-intensive, low-tech, 
and low-growth sectors to high-tech and high-growth sectors. In the process of 
structural adjustment, such macroeconomic forces as factor scarcities at home, an 
uncertain foreign supply of key resources, and a decline in the competitiveness of 
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Japanese labor-intensive goods prompted Japanese firms to invest abroad.
 
 
 Cowling and Tomlinson (2000:368) have argued that ―overseas production has 
had many advantages for keiretsu firms, but has had severe effects on Japan‘s domestic 
industrial sector. In particular, there are now genuine concerns that the expansion of 
overseas production has exacerbated a ―hollowing out‖ of Japanese industry which, in 
the long term, will lead to relative economic decline and stagnation. The global sourcing 
strategies of the apex firms in the keiretsu network have weakened the traditional links 
between the main banks, the apex firms, and their suppliers, and also caused major 
structural demand problems for the smaller firms within the supply-chain network.‖ As 
the keiretsu firms have outsourced their production globally, they are also able to 
outsource their supply chains on a worldwide scale and have started to serve Japan‘s 
domestic markets from their offshore bases, primarily from those in East Asia. 
Therefore many local suppliers who have not been able to relocate their production 
facilities have lost their business with the apex firms
 
(Cowling and Tomlinson 2002: 
374-381). The keiretsu firms‘ management strategies of outsourcing and downsizing 
have precipitated significant structural changes in Japanese corporate finance and 
governance practice. Those structural changes were one of the main reasons behind the 
financial crisis in the 1990s and Japan‘s current economic stagnation. Cowling and 
Tomlinson (2002: 374-377) have argued that ―the negative impact of keiretsu 
outsourcing also appears consistent with the decline, in both nominal and real terms, of 
Japan‘s persistent long running trade surplus. This in turn has contributed to the 
stagnant growth in domestic output. …. In the long run, the demise of the keiretsu 
relationships and the transfer of higher value-added activities overseas will reduce both 




Until the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927, the capital markets, primarily the equity 
market, had been the main source of capital for the many large industrial firms. 
Corporate bond issues rose rapidly during the Meiji era and became the main source of 
external funds for large industrial firms in the early twentieth century. Most of the big 
corporations financed their investment through the Japanese equity and bond markets. 
During this era, individuals, mostly the zaibatsu families, owned and controlled the 
industrial and financial capital; intense conflicts between the members of the ruling elite 
and between individuals within social classes characterized the era.  
Between the Showa Financial Crisis in 1927 and the Korean War in the 1950s, 
control of financial and industrial capital shifted from the zaibatsu families to financial 
and industrial institutions. This major transformation in the ownership and the capital 
structure of corporations and banks lessened the shareholders‘ influence on the 
governance of corporations and the state. The bank-centered cross-shareholding system 
also reduced the level of shareholder influence on managerial decision making and led 
to greater autonomy for the directors. Because the majority of corporations were owned 
by other corporations and financial institutions, Japanese managers became ―the agents 
of the corporate social organs rather than of individual property holders.‖ This 
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autonomy gave managers a greater ability to cooperate with bureaucracy in order to run 
the corporations in alignment with the long term interests of Japanese capitalism. Thus, 
during the high growth era, as an autonomic new ruling class, the corporate managers 
and bureaucrats were able to cooperate and pragmatically transform the socioeconomic 
structure of Japan to align with the long term interests of Japanese capitalism — in 
terms of their perceived common interest — without causing any serious social or class 
struggles.  
 The close relationship between the government, keiretsu firms and financial 
institutions allowed Japan to complete its industrial development process successfully. 
The 1970s was the turning point for the Japanese corporate governance and financial 
system. During the high growth era, the Japanese economy created a unique corporate 
finance and governance model based on the main bank, keiretsu and cross-shareholding 
systems (Aoki 1990, 1994). Therefore Japanese capitalism is frequently cited as an 
alternative model to the Anglo-American style of free market capitalism. Many 
developing countries in the world have closely examined the system and tried to adapt 
the Japanese model to their countries. The Japanese corporate governance and financial 
model worked very well during the 1960s and early 1970s. However, following the end 
of the high growth era Japanese capitalism ―entered a new period of accumulation 
characterized by slower growth and financial instability‖  (Lapavitsas 1997:45). In this 
period Japanese financial institutions and keiretsu firms had to face domestic and 
international structural challenges, which occurred because of the structural changes in 
the keiretsu production system such as outsourcing and downsizing, as well as other 
monetary and financial factors due to the major financial liberalization reforms. Prowse 
(1992:1139) points out, ―the dramatic changes in the Japanese corporate sector in the 
last decades, including improved access to global capital markets and the deregulation 
of domestic capital markets, the slowing of growth opportunities for Japanese firms in 
their traditional lines of business and the huge build-up of cash on Japanese firms‘ 
balance sheets, may have weakened the governance mechanism in the keiretsu groups.‖  
Those structural changes had important repercussions in the system and forced 
Japanese keiretsu firms and financial intuitions to adapt to the new more competitive 
domestic and international environment. ―The decline in the use of the attributes of 
Japanese corporate culture has led firms to examine their corporate structures and to 
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